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NOTES

The Constitution, the Legislature, and Unfair Surprise:
Toward a Reliance-Based Approach to the Contract Clause
Robert A. Graham
INTRODUCTION

During the first eighty years of the Republic, the Contract Clause 1
was the constitutional rule most frequently invoked to strike down
state legislation. 2 Private parties successfully cited the clause's prohibition in challenges to impairments of land grants, 3 corporate charters,4 and private debts. 5 After a period of somewhat reduced
activity, 6 however, the Contract Clause fell into disuse between 1934
and 1977.7 It enjoyed a brief renaissance in the late 1970s, 8 but more
recent Contract Clause challenges to state legislation have met with
limited, if any, success.9
Over the course of our constitutional history, the Supreme Court's
focus in Contract Clause jurisprudence has shifted from a concern for
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 ("No State shall ... pass any •.. Law impairing the
Obligation of Contracts .... "). Private parties raising Contract Clause challenges may do so in
an action for declaratory and injunctive relief. E.g., Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438
U.S. 234 (1978); Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473 (1905). Such challenges, however, also may
arise in actions to quiet title, City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497 (1965), in suits to enforce
contractual rights, Energy Reserves Group Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400
(1983), and by way of defense in actions under a challenged statute. Home Bldg. & Loan Assn.
v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
2. See BENJAMIN F. WRIGHT, JR., THE CONTRACT CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION 51-88
(1938).
3. Fletcher v. Peck, IO U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
4. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
5. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819).
6. During this time, from just after the Civil War to the 1930s, substantive economic due
process came into vogue, thereby decreasing the need for the Contract Clause. See Douglas W.
Kmiec & John 0. McGinnis, The Contract Clause: A Return to the Original Understanding, 14
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 525, 534 (1987).
7. Id.
8. See, e.g., Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978) (striking down a law
impairing pension agreements); United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. I (1977) (strik·
ing down legislation modifying the state's own obligations).
9. See, e.g., General Motors Co. v. Romein, 112 S. Ct. 1105 (1992) (holding constitutional
the application of modified workers' compensation laws to prior claims); Keystone Bituminous
Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987) (denying Contract Clause protection to surface
subsidence damage agreements modified by statute); Energy Reserves Group v. Kansas Power &
Light Co., 459 U.S. 400 (1983) (upholding legislation applied to extant natural gas pricing
schemes).
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individual expectations to the protection of the public good. 10 The
Court's early decisions concerning retroactive state statutes 11 highlight
the clause's original purpose of ensuring that states not defeat private
parties' reliance interests. 12 More recent decisions demonstrate the
Court's departure from the reliance standard. 13 In addressing Contract Clause challenges today, the Court weighs the competing state
and private interests. 14 In doing so, the Court asks whether the law at
issue substantially impairs the individual's contractual rights, whether
the law is intended to serve a significant and legitimate public purpose,
and whether the means utilized by the government to effect that purpose are reasonable and necessary. 15 Further, the Court now takes a
less deferential stand than it once did toward legislative determinations of reasonableness and necessity when the state is a party to the
impaired contract.16
10. See infra Part I.
11. "Retroactive" statutes are those laws that affect private rights created through contracts
entered into before the enactment of the law. One commentator describes the interaction between new law and past and continuing transactions as "vested rights retroactivity." See W.
David Slawson, Constitutional and Legislative Considerations in Retroactive Lawmaking, 48 CAL.
L. REv. 216, 218 (1960) ("If the effect ofa law is substantially to disturb patterns of conduct that
represent substantial investments in labor or property or to remove valuable rights, rights of
action or even liberties, then the law is [vested rights retroactive].") (footnotes omitted).
Slawson contrasts vested rights retroactivity with "method retroactivity." Method retroactivity concerns arise when "laws .•• make rights or duties depend on past events in the narrow
sense of dependence on events that have occurred and terminated before the laws were enacted."
Id. at 217. However, he later asserts that the distinction is illusory because in both cases the
retrospective law affects ongoing rights and claims. Id. at 220.
Although this Note does not rely on the method versus vested rights dichotomy, the reader
should be aware that this Note deals primarily with vested rights retroactivity problems.
12. See, e.g., Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819)
(striking down a law interfering with a chartering party's expectations); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S.
(6 Cranch) 87 (1810) (invalidating a state statute defeating land grant recipients' expectations).
For a full discussion of these two decisions, see infra notes 40-46 and accompanying text.
13. See, e.g., Home Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 444-48 (1934) (introducing a multiple-factored "legitimate ends" test into the Court's determination).
14. That is, the judiciary determines the relative weight of public and private interests implicated. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 485-86, 505-06
(1987) (finding that the public interest in preserving a surface owner's property from subsidence
damage outweighs a mining operator's contractual rights); Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 250-51 (1978) (holding that the severity of the contracting parties' impairment outweighs the government's interest in protecting prisoners). Although the Court does not
explicitly dub its approach a balancing test, numerous commentators have so termed this process
of identifying and comparing substantiality of impairment and significance of state interests. See,
e.g., Note, Rediscovering the Contract Clause, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1414, 1415-16 (1984) (discussing modem Contract Clause jurisprudence); Michael B. Rappaport, Note, A Procedural Approach to the Contract Clause, 93 YALE L.J. 918, 919-22 (1984) (discussing Allied Steel and
United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977)); Richard G. Taranto, Note, A ProcessOriented Approach to the Contract Clause, 89 YALE L.J. 1623, 1641-42 (1980) (discussing Allied
Steel as a balancing case).
15. See Energy Reserves Group v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 411-13 (1983)
(setting forth the elements of the Court's current test). For a full discussion of the Court's balancing factors, see JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 394-407
(4th ed. 1991).
16. See United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 30 (1977).
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From a methodological standpoint, the Court's approach has progressively limited the scope and meaning of the Contract Clause by
reading into it various exceptions. From the landmark case of Home
Building & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdelf 11 through more recent cases, 18
Contract Clause decisions have moved incrementally toward what is
essentially a test of governmental prerogatives. The current standard
determines the clause's applicability according to the strength of the
particular interests a piece of state legislation represents. Through this
piecemeal approach, over time, the Court has moved away from its
original concern for contractual expectations and speaks now primarily in terms of state powers and private impairments. 19 This process of
defining Contract Clause doctrine through a balancing of interests has
deprived the clause of the clarity it once possessed.
In two cases from the 1980s,2° however, the Court resurrected a
modified form of the reliance logic in one factor of its determination.
This factor is known as the "heavily regulated industry" doctrine
(HRID). Under this doctrine, when a party conducts business in a
"heavily regulated" field, the retroactive effects that a new rule imposes on that business will survive Contract Clause scrutiny. The doctrine assumes that a private actor, in entering a heavily regulated field,
knows the government exercises a great deal of control over that industry. The doctrine further assumes that the actor also realizes that
the legal backdrop against which she conducts business is subject to
change. Therefore, the private party cannot reasonably expect her operations and relations, as subject to the changing regulatory scheme, to
remain unaffected by a modification in the law. 21
This Note argues that the Court should return to a reliance-based
approach to Contract Clause challenges, fashioned loosely along the
same lines as the HRID. Although it does not advocate that the
Court revivify the rules created by the early decisions, the Note proposes that the Court look to the private parties' expectations and,
more specifically, to the reasonableness of those expectations in deciding the clause's applicability to a particular case. Part I provides a
brief history of the Contract Clause and its development. This Part
follows the clause from the Constitutional Convention through the
17. 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
18. See infra section I.B.
19. See infra section I.B.
20. Exxon v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176 (1983); Energy Reserves Group v. Kansas Power &
Light Co., 459 U.S. 400 (1983). For a full discussion of these two decisions, see infra notes 11925 and accompanying text.
21. "The justification given for this sweeping principle is that the parties are on notice that if
the legislature has competence in a given field, it may well exercise its powers, and therefore there
is no unfair surprise when these powers are exercised retroactively." Charles B. Hochman, The
Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Retroactive Legislation, 73 HARV. L. REV. 692, 700
(1960).
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1980s to illustrate the Court's departure over time from the original
meaning of the clause. Part II discusses the heavily regulated industry
doctrine and demonstrates how it represents a return to a focus on
party expectations. Having set forth the theoretical underpinnings of
the heavily regulated industry doctrine, this Note in Part III extends
the doctrine's logic to create a modified reliance model for applying
the Contract Clause. The Part argues that the reasonableness of a
party's expectations as to the validity or enforceability of her contracts
varies according to the amount of previous legislation in an area, as
well as the "publicness" of the party's transactions. This Note concludes that this modified reliance approach has several advantages
over the Court's current test, including greater continuity with early
Court precedent and better guidance both for private parties and
legislatures.
I. THE COURT'S SHIFf IN PERSPECTIVE

The Supreme Court's emphasis in its Contract Clause jurisprudence has drifted significantly since the Constitution's ratification.
The clause's early history reflects an overarching theme emphasizing
private reliance marks. 22 Beginning with Home Building & Loan
Assn. v. Blaisdell 23 in 1934, however, the Court has forsaken its original focus on party expectations in favor of a more fluid, but less certain and less predictable, balancing of state power against private
interests. Ultimately, this shift deprives the Contract Clause of a single guiding principle and gives both legislatures and courts more freedom than the Framers intended. 24
This Part illustrates the differences in the Court's treatment of the
22. This period lasted roughly from the time of the Constitutional Convention to the New
Deal era. But see Kmiec & McGinnis, supra note 6, at 534. Kmiec and McGinnis identify four
periods in Contract Clause jurisprudence: 1810-1879, during which the Court vigorously applied
the clause to strike down state legislation; 1879-1934, during which the clause fell into disuse
while economic substantive due process enjoyed broad application; 1934-1977, when the Court
substantially narrowed the purview of the clause, thereby rendering it "a virtual nullity"; and
1977 through the present, during which time the Court has increased scrutiny of state legislation,
without a single coherent approach. See id. Although this Note does not dispute Kmiec and
McGinnis' four-period model, the Note departs from this model because the Court's methodology, though not its application of the clause to particular cases, remains constant between periods one and two and between periods three and four. In light of this Note's focus on
methodology, the distinction between these periods is insignificant.
23. 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
24. See, e.g., Kmiec & McGinnis, supra note 6, at 526. The current absence of a single
guiding principle has drawn criticism in academic circles. Kmiec and McGinnis, for instance,
note:
It is ironic that the Supreme Court has chosen to apply the Contract Clause by balancing
social interests in the manner of the legislature when the intent of the Clause was to forbid
legislatures from retrospectively interfering with contracts. It is equally ironic that the
Supreme Court has interpreted a constitutional provision that was designed to provide certainty to contracting parties in a manner that maximizes the unpredictability of its
application.
Id. at 559.
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Contract Clause from the time of the Constitution's ratification
through the present. It further indicates some of the weaknesses of the
Court's current test. Section I.A discusses the clause's early history
and its original aim of protecting individuals' reasonable reliance interests. Section I.B examines the Supreme Court's more recent treatment
of Contract Clause challenges and illustrates the Court's change in
perspective over time. This section argues that the doctrinal shift from
protection of party expectations leaves individuals without standards
by which to judge the wisdom of entering into particular transactions.
Such an effect is particularly perverse in light of the Contract Clause's
purpose of providing stability in private contracts. This departure also
permits a lack of discipline on the part of both courts and legislatures
in determining the wisdom and constitutionality of a given piece of
legislation.

A. Early History: Focus on Party Expectations
An examination of the preratification history of the Contract
Clause demonstrates that the Framers• purpose in including the clause
was to protect contracting parties from the unfair surprise25 wrought
by state legislatures. 26 Although the Contract Clause was not the subject of heavy debate in the Constitutional Convention, 27 the records of
the Framers and the contemporaneous public discussion reveal an intent to protect contracting parties' expectations by prohibiting legislative interference with those expectations. 28 The clause derives from a
portion of the Ordinance of the Northwest Territory providing that no
law "shall in any manner whatever interfere with, or affect private
contracts or engagements, bona fide, and without fraud previously
formed ... 29 The purpose of the quoted enactment was the "just preservation of rights and property.'•3o
Unfortunately, unlike the Ordinance, the Contract Clause as ratified includes no statement of intent. Further, the debate in the Federal
Convention centered more on the wisdom of the rule the clause em25. This Note uses "unfair surprise" to indicate the defeat of a reasonable expectation. It
does not intend the term to be a qualitative judgment.
26. See Bernard Schwartz, Old Wine in Old Bottles? The Renaissance of the Contract Clause,
1979 SUP. Cr. REv. 95, 96-97 (discussing the historical and theoretical bases of the clause).
27. "If a study of the social and political context of the clause reveals little about the intentions of the framers, not much more is to be gleaned from the historical accounts of the debates
at the drafting and ratifying conventions." Richard A. Epstein, Toward a Revitalization of tlte
Contract Clause, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 703, 706 (1984).
28. See THE FEDERALIST No. 44 (James Madison); James Madison, Journal (Aug. 28,
1787), in THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 439 (Max Farrand ed.,
1911).
29. An Ordinance for the Government of the Territory of the United States north-west of the
river Ohio, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 51, 52 (1789).
30. 1 Stat. 52 (1789).
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bodies than on its purpose. 31 Nonetheless, the ratification debates
demonstrate a clear intent to preserve "rights and property" from retroactive state legislation. 32
James Madison provided a detailed discussion of the clause's
groundings in the Federalist Papers, in which he indicated that the
clause was intended to create security in private expectations. In Federalist No. 44, Madison wrote:
Very properly therefore have the Convention added this constitutional
bulwark in favor of personal security and private rights; and I am much
deceived if they have not in so doing as faithfully consulted the genuine
sentiments, as the undoubted interests of their constituents. The sober
people of America are weary of the fluctuating policy which has directed
the public councils. They have seen with regret and with indignation,
that sudden changes and legislative inferences in cases affecting personal
rights, become jobs in the hands of enterprizing and influential speculators; and snares to the more industrious and less informed part of the
community. They have seen, too, that legislative interference, is but the
first link of a long chain of repetitions; every subsequent interference
being naturally produced by the effects of the preceding. They very
rightly infer, therefore, that some thorough reform is wanting which will
banish speculations on public measures, inspire a general prudence and
industry, and give a regular course to the business of society. 33

Although some have argued that the "fluctuating policy," "sudden
changes," and "legislative interferences" to which Madison referred
consist only of debtor relief laws, 34 the clause's broad language does
not suggest such a limited reading. 35 Moreover, Madison's own reference to the Contract Clause as a "constitutional bulwark in favor of
personal security and private rights" plainly addresses all types of unfair retroactive legislation, not merely a narrow segment of such
laws. 36
Early in its history, the Supreme Court adopted a similar view of
the Contract Clause and unfair surprise. The Court's early Contract
Clause decisions hinged on what this Note terms the "traditional reli31. See WRIGHT, supra note 2, at 1-12. As Wright indicates, there was little discussion of the
clause during either the Convention or the ratification process. The issues raised typically concerned whether contractual impairments fell within the purview of the Ex Post Facto Clause, id.
at 9-10, whether "such a provision would interfere with the passage of necessary legislation relating to the bringing of actions," id. at 8, and whether the prohibition would prevent states from
reacting to "great public calamities and distress." Id. at 13.
32. See Madison, supra note 28, at 440.
33. THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 301-02 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961); see
also THE FEDERALIST supra, No. 62 (James Madison), at 418-22 (voicing similar concerns regarding the length of Senate terms).
34. See WRIGHT, supra note 2, at 13-15 (discussing concern for stability of private debts at
time of ratification). But see Kmiec & McGinnis, supra note 6, at 533-34 (refuting the debtor
relief theory of clause's purpose).
35. See Epstein, supra note 27, at 706-07 (discussing the intentional generality of the clause's
language).
36. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 33, at 301.
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ance model." 37 In these cases, the Court looked to the private expectations the impaired contract reflected to determine whether a
Contract Clause violation had occurred. For instance, Chief Justice
Marshall asserted that impairment of contracts by state legislatures
had the effect of "break[ing] in upon the ordinary intercourse of society, and destroy[ing] all confidence between man and man." 38 He also
opined that such interference "sap[ped] the morals of the people, and
destroy[ed] the sanctity of private faith." 39
The opinion of the Court in Fletcher v. Peck 40 provides a good
example of the Court's use of the traditional reliance model. In this
case, the Court struck down a Georgia statute defeating the expectations of purchasers in the Yazoo land sale. The Georgia act sought to
nullify land grants by the state legislature that were facilitated by
"open and wholesale bribery."41 In holding that the law violated the
Contract Clause, Chief Justice Marshall reasoned that the Framers
designed the clause to check "the violent acts which grow out of the
feelings of the moment; and that the people of the United States, in
adopting that instrument, have manifested a determination to shield
themselves and their property from the effects of those sudden and
strong passions to which men are exposed."42 The Court thus posited
that the Contract Clause's purpose was to protect parties from unexpected deprivations of vested rights.
Still early in the nation's history, the Court in Trustees of
Dartmouth College v. Woodward 43 found a Contract Clause violation
by looking to the express intent of the contracting parties. 44 This deference to express intent also reflects the Framers' concern for protecting party expectations.45 Chief Justice Marshall, writing for the
majority, found that the state of New Hampshire's attempt to modify
the terms of Dartmouth College's charter ran afoul of the Contract
Clause's prohibition. The Court specifically noted as its guiding principle "the necessity and policy of giving permanence and security to
contracts, [and] of withdrawing them from the influence of legislative
37. E.g., Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819);
Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). The traditional reliance model looks to the
parties' actual expectations to determine whether the Contract Clause forbids state interference.
See Taranto, supra note 14, at 1627-29.
38. Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 354-55 (1827) (Marshall, C.J., dissenting).
39. 25 U.S. at 354-55.
40. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
41. WRIGHT, supra note 2, at 21.
42. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 138.
43. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
44. The Court determined the parties' express intent by examining the "will of the founder,
expressed in the charter." Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518,
652 (1819). The Court emphasized the founders' intent to demonstrate the presence of an injury
due to the legislation.
45. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 648-50.
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bodies, whose fluctuating policy, and repeated interferences, produced
the most perplexing and injurious embarrassments."46
Even the early cases that created limited exceptions to the clause's
application adopted a view that the clause aimed to protect reasonable
party expectations. In the eminent domain and police powers cases,47
the Court addressed the tension between the state's interest in providing for the common good and in satisfying private expectations. The
conflict between these two interests arises when the state seeks by way
of retroactive legislation to forbid conduct or destroy rights in the
name of the public welfare. In this context, a court must either thwart
the state in its efforts to serve its citizenry by preserving the vested
contractual rights or defeat the private rights by permitting the state
to execute its policies as the state sees fit. In this line of cases, the
Court reasoned that individual expectations must yield when in conflict with a state's powers.48 It therefore carved out limited exceptions
to the Contract Clause's broad sweep.49 Yet the Court did not reach
this result by an ad hoc balancing of the rights and powers at issue in
each circumstance. Rather, the Court created a rule of contractual
construction that presumed that party expectations were tempered by
knowledge of certain of the state's substantive powers, such as its police and eminent domain powers.
The first exception to the Contract Clause permitted a state to exercise its eminent domain power. In West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 50
the West River Bridge Company challenged a Vermont statute allowing municipalities to take, in the interest of the public good, private
property to establish public roads. 51 In its discussion of the Contract
Clause question, the Court set forth the competing constitutional rules
at issue. While acknowledging the importance of the prohibition
against the impairment of contracts, the Court stated:
[I]n every political sovereign community there inheres necessarily the
right and the duty of guarding its own existence, and of protecting and
promoting the interests and welfare of the community at large.... This
power, denominated the eminent domain of the State, is, as its name
imports, paramount to all private rights vested under the government, and
these last are, by necessary implication, held in subordination to this
power, and must yield in every instance to its proper exercise. 52
46. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 648.
47. See, e.g., Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814 (1880) (addressing police powers); West
River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507 (1848) (addressing eminent domain power).
48. See, e.g., Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 480-81 (1905) (cataloguing cases supporting
the view that the state's interest in protecting its citizens is paramount to private contractual
rights).
49. See infra notes 50-64 and accompanying text.
50. 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507 (1848).
51. 47 U.S. (6 How.) at 530-31.
52. 47 U.S. (6 How.) at 531-32 (second emphasis added).
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The Court noted that, despite the Constitution's position as the
supreme law of the land, a court should not construe the Contract
Clause to deprive the states of their powers of "self-government and
self-preservation."s3 Because the eminent domain power fell within
those powers, the Court upheld the state statute.
Of particular importance in the Court's decision were the legal bases upon which property rights rest. Because rights in land within a
state's boundaries exist only by virtue of state grant and state protection, every private sale or possession of title in land involves an element of state consent. As such, the Court noted:
[I]nto all contracts, whether made between States and individuals or between individuals only, there enter conditions which arise not out of the
literal terms of the contract itself; they are superinduced by the preexisting and higher authority of the laws of nature, of nations, or of the community to which the parties belong; they are always presumed, and must
be presumed, to be known and recognized by all, are binding upon all,
and need never, therefore, be carried into express stipulation, for this
could add nothing to their force. Every contract is made in subordination to them, and must yield to their control, as conditions inherent and
paramount, wherever a necessity for their execution shall occur. s4

The Court thus read into every property right the implied condition
that whatever interest may have existed in that property was always
subject to the state's necessary power to resume possession of that
property.ss The exception became part of the contract itself.
This implied term methodology also appeared in the police powers
cases. In Stone v. Mississippi, s6 the Supreme Court addressed a Contract Clause challenge to legislation revoking a twenty-five-year charter for the operation of a lottery. The post-Civil War provisional
government in Mississippi had granted the charter, but, one year later,
the state adopted a new constitution forbidding the authorization of a
lottery.s7 The central issue in Stone was whether "the legislature of a
State can, by the charter of a lottery company, defeat the will of the
people, authoritatively expressed, in relation to the further continuance of such business in their midst."S 8 In its analysis, while acknowledging that the limits of the police power are poorly defined, the Court
stated that the power at least "extends to all matters affecting the pub53. 47 U.S. (6 How.) at 532.
54. 47 U.S. (6 How.) at 532 (emphasis added).
55. " 'This right of resumption may be exercised, not only where the safety, but also where
the interest, or even the expediency, of the State is concerned.' " 47 U.S. (6 How.) at 535 (quoting Beekman v. Saratoga & Schenectady R.R., 3 Paige Ch. (N.Y.) 45, 73 (1831)). The breadth of
this power thus distinguishes it from the police power discussed infra notes 55-63 and accompanying text.
56. 101 U.S. 814 (1879).
57. 101 U.S. at 819.
58. 101 U.S. at 819.
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lie health or the public morals." 59 Because the Court considered lotteries and gambling to be included in such matters, it found that they
were subject to the operation of the police powers. 60 Therefore, the
Court held the legislation to be valid.
More important for current purposes is the Court's discussion of
the inalienable character of the state's police power and how this inalienability creates an implied term in ·all contracts. The majority
stated that a legislature may not "bargain away" the ability to provide
for public health, safety, and morals,61 nor can it "divest itself of the
power to provide for them. " 62 By reading into every contract a police
powers escape clause, the Court exempted statutes affecting the public
health, safety, and morals from the Contract Clause's prohibition.
Although it refused to protect actual party expectations in such circumstances, the Court maintained a focus on reliance. By demanding
that parties consider the possibility that the state would exercise its
police powers, the Court did not wholly abandon its traditional reliance model, but rather limited the model by defining an area in which
reliance on legal stability is inherently unreasonable. 63 In other words,
the Court required that the party expectations be reasonable in order
to receive protection. The Court deemed that reasonable expectations
account for the state's police power. 64
B. Blaisdell and the Court's Shift in Perspective
In an attempt to expand the limited exemptions embodied in the
eminent domain and police powers decisions, the Supreme Court in
the 1934 case Home Building & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdel/ 65 shifted its
emphasis from party reliance to an examination of state prerogatives.
Methodologically speaking, the Court abandoned the implied term
59. 101 U.S. at 818.
60. 101 U.S. at 818-19.
61. " 'Irrevocable grants of property and franchises may be made if they do not impair the
supreme authority to make laws for the right government of the State; but no legislature can
curtail the power of its successors to make such laws as they may deem proper in matters of
police.'" 101 U.S. at 817-18 (quoting Metropolitan Bd. of Excise v. Barrie, 34 N.Y. 657 (1866)).
62. 101 U.S. at 819.
63. Moreover, given the conditions under which the charter was granted, it is not entirely
clear that the lottery company did not expect that the charter might be modified. At that time,
most, if not all, of the states, heavily disfavored lotteries and the U.S. Congress had passed a law
forbidding the use of the mails for lottery purposes. 101 U.S. at 819. Indeed, up until the time of
the provisional government, Mississippi had prohibited lotteries. 101 U.S. at 819. The company
therefore might have foreseen that once the state returned to popular control the state would
resume its original policy.
64. The same logic applies in contracts between private parties, not merely in situations involving state-individual relations. See Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473 (1905) (holding that a
state's grant of a franchise impairing an obligation between the grantee and another private party
does not run afoul of the Contract Clause when the state takes such action in the exercise of its
police powers).
65. 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
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logic of the earlier cases for an ad hoc balancing test permitting the
state to exercise its powers irrespective of reasonable expectations,
constructive or actual. 66
By way of a four-factor test, Blaisdell 67 extended the earlier exemptions from the mere power to provide for health, safety, and
morals to a broader power to react to other emergencies. Blaisdell
involved a Minnesota mortgage moratorium law passed to relieve certain effects of the extant economic depression. 68 In upholding the
Minnesota law, the Court rested its reasoning on a long examination
of the historical exercise of the police power and the prerogatives of
the legislature. 69 The Court cited the rule that the Contract Clause
will not prevent a legislature from reacting to natural and physical
disasters, 70 or to scarcity affecting the common weal. 71 The Blaisdell
Court found that, read together, the decisions permitting such reaction
represented a "growing recognition of public needs and the relation of
individual right to public security."72 In light of these "public needs,"
the legislature must have "the capacity ... to protect [the public's]
fundamental interests," even in the face of vested individual interests. 73 The Court therefore extended what had been a narrow exception for the police and eminent domain powers, or "reserved" powers,
to cover legislation "addressed to a legitimate end. " 74
For present purposes, Blaisdell is significant for the Court's test to
determine the "legitimacy" of the state end put forth to support a
challenged statute. Whereas the Stone Court discussed the police
power as an apparently unqualified power, 75 the "legitimate ends"
analysis under Blaisdell required: (1) the existence of an emergency;
(2) that the "relief afforded ... be of a character appropriate to that
emergency"; (3) that the impairment be reasonable; and (4) that the
legislation be effective only during the exigency. 76 The "appropriate
66. Again, the "implied term" methodology represents an approach whereby the Court read
into every contract an implied term: the contracting parties realized and voluntarily subjected
themselves to the possibility that the legislature might modify their contract by statute. For a
discussion of the Blaisdell test, see infra notes 67-77 and accompanying text.
67. 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
68. Specifically, the law allowed for postponement of foreclosure and sale of properties for
which the holder was in default, and for extension of the holder's redemption period. These
provisions were effective during the period the legislature had determined an emergency to exist.
290 U.S. at 415-18.
69. 290 U.S. at 439-42.
70. American Land Co. v. Zeiss, 219 U.S. 47 (1911) (upholding California emergency title
registry legislation enacted in the wake of a catastrophic San Francisco earthquake).
71. Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921) (holding a District of Columbia rent control statute
valid in light of a housing shortage due to World War I).
72. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 443-44.
73. 290 U.S. at 443-44.
74. 290 U.S. at 445 (emphasis added).
75. See supra notes 56-64 (discussing Stone v. Mississippi and the police powers doctrine).
76. 290 U.S. at 444-47.
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character" and "reasonable impairment" requirements permit a court
to make discretionary judgments based on factors that are inherently
relative. 77 Moreover, these factors render legitimate a state act regardless of whether a private party should have factored the possibility of
such action into its decision to contract. Although the Court could
have retained the implied term methodology by creating an "emergency condition" exception similar to the police powers exception, the
Court instead opted for a more sweeping and open-ended standard.
The Blaisdell opinion thus departs from the focus on reliance embodied in the constitutional history and the Court's prior jurisprudence.
Later applications of the legitimate ends test broadened the exception as defined in Blaisdell and thus narrowed the purview of the Contract Clause. The Court thereby afforded legislatures even greater
leeway in crafting laws that impaired contracts. For instance, the
Court held that emergency conditions need not exist in order for the
state to impair contracts in the name of mere "legitimate ends." 78
Further, the Court later noted that, with respect to necessity and reasonableness determinations, courts usually will defer to legislative
judgments.79 In doing so, the Court effectively abandoned Blaisdell's
demand that an impairment be "reasonable."
The Court's holding in Blaisdell set the stage for later decisions in
which the Court engaged in wholesale balancing without regard to
party reliance or unfair surprise. Blaisdell and its progeny essentially
ignored the Contract Clause's original goal and thereby created an atmosphere in which market actors are uncertain as to how a court
might treat their contracts. Rather, this line of cases leaves contracting parties to the whim of a balancing court's weighing of the
factors that the particular court deems relevant. 80
Drawing upon Blaisdell and subsequent cases defining and broadening the legitimate ends doctrine, the Court has formulated the test it
currently applies. This test requires judges to engage in a multiplefactor balancing, in which they consider whether the state legislation
is "reasonable and necessary to serve an important public purpose, " 81
as well as whether the impairment to the contract is "severe." 82 The
modem Contract Clause jurisprudence vividly demonstrates the
Court's abandonment of its original single-principled approach and its
adoption of a less consistent, less certain standard. The Court now
77. See Rappaport, supra note 14, at 919 n.7 (examining the language of the Court's current
test).
78. Veix v. Sixth Ward Bldg. & Loan, 310 U.S. 32, 39-40 (1940) (permitting states retroactively to apply modified building and loan laws even in the absence of an emergency).
79. United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. l, 22-23 (1977).
80. See Rappaport, supra note 14, at 919 n.7 (discussing problems associated with the judicial discretion entailed in the current balancing test).
81. United States Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 25 (emphasis added).
82. E.g., Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 246 (1978).
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looks primarily to the relative strength of the interests served and impaired by the legislation.
The Court's analysis in United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey 83
illustrates a continued adherence to Blaisdel/'s basic blueprint. This
adherence is particularly striking in light of the fact that United States
Trust was the first of two cases that comprised the late-1970s revival of
the Contract Clause. In United States Trust, New Jersey had repealed
a 1962 statute under which both New York and New Jersey agreed to
limit the number of "mass transit deficit operations" the Port Authority could undertake. 84 Those challenging the action argued that the
repeal sharply devalued the bonds in secondary markets and, more
importantly, modified a statutory contract between the state and the
bondholders. 85 Although the Court struck down the New Jersey
act, 86 it demonstrated a willingness to uphold legislation not only
when the state acts under a recognized power, but also when the
"challenged state legislation [is] sufficiently important to warrant the
legislation's frustration of contract-based expectations." 87 Even while
recognizing the Contract Clause's purpose of protecting such expectations, United States Trust allows a court to abrogate that purpose
through its balancing test.
A subsequent case made more clear the distance between the
Court's original approach and its current test. In Allied Structural
Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 88 the second decision in the Contract Clause's
renaissance, the Court struck down a Minnesota pension benefits law
on Contract Clause grounds. 8 9 The majority in Allied Steel looked to
83. 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
84. 431 U.S. at 9-10. "Mass transit deficit operations" under the statute included, with enumerated exceptions, any rail transportation system or project. 431 U.S. at 10.
85. 431 U.S. at 17, 19.
86. The Court rested its ruling on the notion that the State had not employed a less drastic
means to achieve its goals. United States Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 29-31. Figuring prominently in
the Court's holding was the fact that New Jersey sought to modify its own contractual obligation
through the repeal. See 431 U.S. at 26, 31. There is some doubt, however, as to the validity of
the Court's distinction between public and private contracts. See, e.g., Kmiec & McGinnis, supra
note 6, at 546 n.101, 547 (criticizing the distinction on the grounds that it enjoys no support from
constitutional history or prior jurisprudence). For a possible justification of the Court's rationale
in so holding, see infra note 174 and accompanying text (discussing government contracts).
87. Note, supra note 14, at 1415-16 & n.10; see also 431 U.S. at 18-21, 28-32 (discussing the
relative importance of private and state interests).
88. 438 U.S. 234 (1978).
89. The statute required certain employers ceasing business operations in the state to
purchase deferred annuities to cover the pensions of all employees who had worked for the em·
player for 10 or more years. Allied Steel, 438 U.S. at 238. The statute subjected the employer to
this "pension funding charge" if the existing pension funds were insufficient to provide for all
employees described above. This law was inconsistent with the petitioner's pension agreement
with its labor force. The agreement created a tripartite priority system whereby the employer
would use the funds first to pay those already retired, then those eligible for retirement, and,
finally, those who did not yet have pension rights. The petitioner's contractual obligations, un·
like those the law imposed, extended only as far as the amount in the pension fund. 438 U.S. at
237-38.
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three factors in its balancing test: substantial impairment, existence of
an "important general social problem," and existence of an emergency.90 Although "the high value the Framers placed on the protection of private contracts" 91 proved influential in the Court's holding,
that factor alone did not provide a sufficient standard to determine the
validity of the act at issue. Rather, the Court returned to the balancing analysis in which it had engaged since Blaisdell. The Court first
found the state had "substantially impaired" the petitioner's contract
by modifying what the Court dubbed a "basic term" of that contract. 92
Further, the Court found no apparent "important general social problem" that the statute might purport to remedy. 93 Because the law applied only to private employers with one hundred or more workers
terminating operations in the state, it would only affect a very narrow
class. The Court thus distinguished the statute from the one at issue
in Blaisdell. 94 Of particular import for the Court were the facts that
the challenged legislation was not temporary in nature, and no economic emergency justified its enactment. 95 Consequently, no overriding state interest saved the statute from constitutional attack under the
Contract Clause.
Even after this brief resurrection of the clause came to an end, the
Court continued to cling to its practice of balancing interests in Contract Clause challenges. A recent manifestation of this phenomenon is
Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis. 96 Keystone Coal involved an unsuccessful challenge to a Pennsylvania statute by an association of coal mining operators.97 The operators asserted that the
statute impaired agreements under which claims arising from damages
to surface property were waived. Therefore, according to the petitioners, the law violated the Contract Clause. The Court, however, ruled
that the statute did not create an impermissible contractual modifica90. 438 U.S. at 244-50. In light of the Court's abandonment of the "emergency" requirement in Veix v. Sixth Ward Bldg. & Loan Assn., 310 U.S. 32 (1940), it is unclear why the Court
invoked it here. The obvious tone of Allied Steel reflects the majority's wish to resurrect the
clause as a basis for vigorous constitutional review. Perhaps the Court felt that in order to do so
it would have to narrow the circumstances in which a state could win in a balancing. See Note,
supra note 14, at 1417 & n.18 (discussing the Court's method in Allied Steel as "strict scrutiny").
91. Allied Steel, 438 U.S. at 245.
92. 438 U.S. at 244-46. The language of reasonable expectation and reliance is particularly
prevalent in this portion of the opinion. The Court specifically stated that in light of the employer's compliance with applicable tax laws, and the absence of any other legislative requirements regarding pensions, "[t]he company ... had no reason to anticipate that its employees'
pension rights could become vested except in accordance with the terms of the plan." 438 U.S. at
245-46.
93. 438 U.S. at 247-49.
94. 438 U.S. at 248-49.
95. 438 U.S. at 249.
96. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
97. The act in question required operators to leave in place coal supporting the land on
which "protected" surface structures rested. 480 U.S. at 502.
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tion. 98 Once again, the Court relied on a fluid balancing test in reaching its decision. Although it found that the state of Pennsylvania had
substantially impaired the contractual rights of the petitioners, 99 the
Court held that, in light of the significant public purpose that the statute served 100 and the high degree of deference accorded to the legislature's choice of means to effect a legitimate end, 101 the law satisfied the
modem Contract Clause standard.
Keystone Coal and the other recent decisions have solidified the
Court's balancing approach, yet problems with this approach are manifest. The Contract Clause decisions since Blaisdell suffer from common weaknesses: overly broad judicial discretion, a dearth of
standards for private actors, and an undue tolerance of undisciplined
legislatures. First, the Court's current balancing approach permits inconsistent determinations in largely similar contexts. A juxtaposition
of the Court's holdings in Blaisdell and Allied Steel serves to illustrate
this phenomenon. While the Court in Blaisdell found that the economic crisis present at that time gave rise to an "emergency" within
the meaning of the Blaisdell test, the Allied Steel Court found no such
emergency. Indeed, although no serious general economic malaise existed at the time of Allied Steel, there apparently was a crisis in pension plans sufficient to give rise to a national initiative, ERISA. 102 The
Court's finding of an emergency in Blaisdell and not in Allied Steel
thus raises doubts as to the validity of the Court's methodology; one
could dispute whether the state's interest in protecting pensioners'
benefits is any less compelling than its interest in protecting the homes
of its citizenry. 103 The sort of arbitrary distinction between these two
values, which a balancing test permits, further deprives the Court's
current standard of any pretense of consistency and fairness. Even if
this distinction rests on the notion that the law in Allied Steel affects
fewer people than that in Blaisdell, the balancing test relegates the
Contract Clause to a mere matter of line drawing without regard to
the clause's purpose of protecting contracting parties from unfair sur98. 480 U.S. at 478-79.
99. Because the act "remove[d] the surface owners' contractual obligations to waive damages," the Court agreed "that the statute operate[d] as 'a substantial impairment of a contractual
relationship.' " 480 U.S. at 504 (quoting Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234,
244 (1978) (footnote omitted)).
100. 480 U.S. at 485-86.
101. This aspect of the Keystone Coal opinion is somewhat confusing. While acknowledging
the need that the modification of obligations be of a character appropriate to the state's goals, 480
U.S. at 505-06, the Court stated that, outside of a government contract scenario, it would not
"second guess [a state's] determinations [as to] the most appropriate ways of dealing with [a]
problem.'' 480 U.S. at 506. The Court thus seems to indicate that it will at once scrutinize and
defer to legislative decisionmaking. See Kmiec & McGinnis, supra note 6, at 552.
102. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1001-1461 (1988)).
103. See, e.g., Kmiec & McGinnis, supra note 6, at 549.
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prise. As the comparison between the holdings in Allied Steel and
Blaisdell demonstrates, the sort of interest one Justice or iteration of
the Court might view as "substantial," "compelling," or "important"
in one context may not be so strong in another set of circumstances.
Further, the relative weights judges assign to the same factor may vary
drastically.104
Secondly, if the Court is indeed concerned with contract as a basis
for "order[ing] ... personal and business affairs," 105 a balancing test
certainly does not further that concern. By creating unnecessary uncertainty through judicial discretion and by failing to provide objective
factors against which to judge the reasonableness of one's reliance, the
Court has created a setting in which individuals must make a blind
gamble when entering certain sorts of contracts. A market actor can
only hope that, when a state enacts a retroactive statute, the balancing
judge's subjective views harmonize with the private party's prediction.
Finally, the Court's balancing analysis allows states to pass overly
sweeping legislation without regard to potential adverse retroactive effects. The legislature, absent some constant view of the meaning of the
Contract Clause's prohibition, will not be deterred from passing laws
without first determining whether those laws survive Contract Clause
scrutiny. Rather, the legislature will more likely be inclined to chance
a favorable balance in the courts.
II. THE HEAVILY REGULATED INDUSTRY DOCTRINE AND
UNCERTAINTY

The Court's recent treatment of Contract Clause challenges departs from the balancing approach described above in the context of
heavily regulated industries. A heavily regulated industry is one for
which the state has created an extensive body of regulatory law. 106
Historical and pervasive regulation of certain fields has given rise to
the heavily regulated industry doctrine, whereby a court imputes to
the legislature an intent to control all aspects of an enterprise. 107 The
doctrine thus creates a broad rule that changes in a regulatory scheme
will presumptively defeat a claim of reliance in a Contract Clause
challenge.
The HRID represents a partial return by the Court to an expectations-based approach in modem Contract Clause challenges. The basic reasoning of the doctrine is couched in reliance and unfair surprise
104. Compare United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 31 (1977) (majority characterizing the impairment as "drastic") with United States Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 41 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (describing impairment as causing "the most minimal damage").
105. Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 245 (1978).
106. See Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176, 194 & n.14 (1983).
107. See 462 U.S. at 194 & n.14.
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terms. 108 That is, by forcing private parties to recognize that the state
exercises relative hegemony over a field, the doctrine presumes that
those parties cannot reasonably expect legislative change not to affect
private transactions in that area. Underlying this rationale are certain
implicit assumptions concerning the nature of legal rules and the prerogatives of the bodies promulgating those rules. The doctrine rests in
part on the inherent fluidity of laws and regulations in areas of heavy
regulation. 109 Because the rules are mutable, the more pervasive an
area's legal scheme, the less certainty an actor in that area will have.
One cannot avoid this mutability by making a contract in the area,
thereby creating some measure of stability. 110 The doctrine imposes
the burden of this uncertainty on the private actor. In other words,
the doctrine assumes that the actor has tailored her risk calculus with
uncertainty in mind, and that she realizes that any expectations of
continuity in the area are not reasonable. The doctrine thus mimics
the implied term logic of the eminent domain and police powers
decisions. 11 1
Section II.A reviews the recent decisions invoking the heavily regulated industry doctrine and shows how those decisions reflect a reliance-based approach to the Contract Clause. Further, the section
discusses how the doctrine departs from the current balancing test,
and how it permits the state to act for the public good while maintaining a focus on party expectations. Section II.B examines the view of
reliance implicit in the doctrine. This view assumes that, when determining whether to rely on a contract, a private party should look not
only to the isolated transaction, but also to external factors bearing on
the wisdom of that reliance. The section shows that when circumstances surrounding the transaction, such as state control over the
contract's subject matter, suggest that legal change is likely, an expectation of legal stability is unreasonable. This conception of reasonableness and reliance is significant in three ways. First, it demonstrates the
Court's renewed concern for party expectations. Secondly, the
HRID's reasonableness analysis allows the Court to avoid ad hoc
judgments of the Contract Clause's applicability. Finally, as will be108. See Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 413-16
(1983) (discussing the history of natural gas regulation in Kansas and finding that "[p]rice regulation existed and was foreseeable as the type of law that would alter contract obligations"),
109. For full discussion, see infra section 11.C.
110. See, e.g., Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 357 (1908) ("One whose rights,
such as they are, are subject to State restriction, cannot remove them from the power of the state
by making a contract about them. The contract will carry with it the infirmity of the subject
matter.") (citations omitted). Although Justice Holmes' opinion in Hudson Water Co. does not
exemplify the modem heavily regulated industry doctrine, its reasoning mirrors that of the modem doctrine.
111. See, e.g., Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814 (1879); West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47
U.S. 507 (1848). For full discussion of these cases and the implied term doctrine, see supra
section I.A.
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come apparent in Part III, the reasonableness and reliance thesis provides the groundwork for this Note's field occupation model. Section
Il.C identifies certain of these variables and discusses what in the nature of legislatures lends an element of uncertainty to state action.
Section Il.C.1 analyzes the conception of the legislature upon which
the HRID rests. This analysis will entail a discussion of time and uncertainty as well as structural factors creating uncertainty in the state
of the law controlling a contract. The section demonstrates how, in
light of this uncertainty, a party cannot reasonably believe that the
laws affecting a transaction or contract will remain static. Finally, section Il.C.2 examines "inalienability" doctrine, which reasons that certain powers inhere in legislatures, and explains how the heavily
regulated industry doctrine's tolerance of legislative change reflects inalienability concerns. The legislature's inalienable powers further contribute to the uncertainty imposed on contracting parties through state
regulation. Given the HRID's view of reasonable expectations and the
uncertainty associated with legislatures and legislative action, Part II
concludes that, under the HRID, a court would hold expectations unreasonable where the expectations fail to appreciate the possibility of
legislative change in regulated areas or in areas subject to the inalienable powers.
A.

The Heavily Regulated Industry Doctrine Opinions

An early enunciation of the heavily regulated industry doctrine's
methodology appeared in the decision of Veix v. Sixth Ward Building
& Loan Assn. 112 In Veix, the Supreme Court upheld the application of
amended building and loan laws to building and loan shares bought
before the amendments. The challenged portion of the statute modified prior law defining shareholder withdrawal rights. 113 The Court
observed at the outset of its analysis the pervasive nature of building
and loan regulation. 114 It is notable that the Court invoked the Tenth
Amendment police power to find that the regulatory scheme as a
whole constituted a legitimate exercise of legislative authority. 115 As
such, any change in that body of law would also fall within the realm
of state power. The Court thus asserted that, when a private party
purchases "into an enterprise already regulated in the particular to
which [the party] objects, he purchase[s] subject to further legislation
112. 310 U.S. 32 (1940).
113. 310 U.S. at 35.
114. 310 U.S. at 37 ("It is also plain that the [challenged] act was one of a long series regulating the many integrated phases of the building and loan business such as formation, membership,
powers, investments, reports, liquidations, foreign associations and examinations.").
115. "With institutions of such importance to its economy, the 'State retains police powers
adequate to authorize the enactment of statutes regulating the withdrawal of shares.... [T]he
obligation of the Association to respond to the application for withdrawal was subject to the
paramount police power." 310 U.S. at 38 (footnote omitted).
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upon the same topic."116
Veix functions as a natural extension of the Stone Court's implied
term jurisprudence. 117 In Stone, the Court held that a party must at
all times temper its expectations with knowledge of the state's power
to provide for the public health, safety, and morals. 118 Similarly, when
a party initially contracts subject to a statute furthering a legitimate
state interest, that party recognizes the state interest and should not be
surprised by subsequent laws in the same area. The Court essentially
created an implied contractual term providing for such legal change.
More recently, the Court has upheld modifications in the law even
when the prior law did not directly regulate the contract at issue. In
Energy Reserves Group v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 119 Energy
Reserves Group unsuccessfully challenged a Kansas statute controlling natural gas prices following federal deregulation. The Court
maintained a balancing test, yet factored into its consideration
"whether the industry the complaining party has entered has been regulated in the past." 120 The Court found that the natural gas industry
was a heavily regulated field despite Kansas's failure specifically to
regulate natural gas prices at the time of contracting. Because of the
"extensive and intrusive" nature of the state's supervision of several
aspects of the enterprise, 121 the new law defeated no reasonable
expectations. 122
Similarly, the Court in Exxon v. Eagerton 123 addressed a Contract
Clause challenge to changes in state oil and gas laws. The Court
found that a prohibition on the power of producers and distributors to
pass along to purchasers the costs of a severance tax in fact restricted
contractual obligations. 124 Nevertheless, the Court held that, because
116. 310 U.S. at 38 (footnote omitted). The Court justified this pronouncement by analogy
to reserved power statutes whereby states are able to modify corporate charters. 310 U.S. at 40.
The apparent connection between these two phenomena is that in both contexts, the state seeks
to assert - either explicitly or implicitly - essentially plenary control over a matter.
117. See supra notes 56-64 and accompanying text.
118. Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 821 (1879).
119. 459 U.S. 400 (1983).
120. 459 U.S. at 411. The elements of the test include inquiry into (1) the degree of impairment of the contract; (2) the public purpose behind the legislation; and (3) the reasonableness of
the regulation in light of the purpose. 459 U.S. at 411-13. The Court thus did not abandon its
balancing test but rather supplemented it with the heavily regulated industry doctrine. 459 U.S.
at 411. Because of this adherence to the balancing test, it is unclear exactly how prominently the
doctrine figured in arriving at the Court's holding.
121. 459 U.S. at 413-14 & n.18.
122. 459 U.S. at 413-16. The Court noted that "[s]tate authority to regulate natural gas
prices is well established." 459 U.S. at 413 (citing Cities Serv. Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co.,
340 U.S. 179 (1950)). Energy Reserves Group thus seems to follow the formula of Veix, that is,
asserting the legitimacy of the underlying scheme, then finding heavy regulation defeating
reliance.
123. 462 U.S. 176 (1983).
124. The party challenging the statute retained the right to pass on the cost of the severance
tax by contract. See 462 U.S. at 189 n.10.
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regulation of the oil and gas industry fell well within the realm of the
legislative power, regulation of the burden of taxation also was within
that realm. 125 The Court thus apparently engaged in a two-step process, whereby it examined whether the initial exercise of power in that
field was valid, then gave deference to state action in that field. Regardless of whether the state had spoken with respect to the specific
matter on which the party seeks to contract, the Court would not invalidate a legal rule contravening agreed-to terms if the law fell within
a field already subject to legitimate state regulation. The Court thus
imputed validity from a general class of acts to a specific act.
Questions still exist as to exactly how much legislative activity in
an area gives rise to heavy regulation. For instance, as Energy
Reserves Group and Exxon suggest, laws touching upon the subject
matter of the statute in a state or even another jurisdiction might create heavy regulation. Whether this also means that tangential regulation might render an entire industry heavily regulated is not clear.
The closest the Supreme Court has come to enunciating a standard is
in a Fourth Amendment context. 126 In Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., the
Labor Department argued that the presence of occupational safety and
health regulations rendered Barlow's a " 'pervasively regulated business'" and therefore not protected by the Warrant Clause for OSHA
purposes. 127 The Court rejected this assertion, however, reasoning
that the pervasive regulation exception to Fourth Amendment rights
applies only to industries with "such a history of government oversight that no reasonable expectation of privacy ... could exist." 128
Although Barlow's arose in a context wholly unrelated to the Contract
Clause, the Court's discussion of pervasive regulation in that case
might prove instructive in determining what constitutes a heavily regulated industry.
The HRID represents a return to a focus on reasonable expectations in Contract Clause challenges. Although it permits a statute to
defeat actual party expectations, it does so only when the party was
unreasonable in its reliance. The doctrine achieves this effect by defining as inherently unreasonable an expectation of legal stability in a
heavily regulated field. The doctrine thus gives parties a constant
standard against which to judge the wisdom of transacting in reliance
on the state of the law.
B. Reliance and Reasonableness

The heavily regulated industry doctrine is important not only because of its return to a focus on reliance, but also because of the view
125.
126.
127.
128.

462 U.S. at 194 & n.14.

See Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
436 U.S at 313 (quoting United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972)).
436 U.S. at 313 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)).
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of reliance the doctrine manifests. The heavily regulated industry doctrine imposes on contracting parties' reliance claims a requirement of
reasonableness. That is, the doctrine deems that market actors should
acknowledge substantial government control of their enterprise and
tailor their expectations in light of that control.
Although much of the HRID's view of reliance is unspoken, the
concept of reasonableness of expectations enjoys extensive discussion
in legal scholarship. Professor Stephen Munzer explains that a "reasonable expectation" requires both "rationality" and "legitimacy." 129
The rationality of an expectation depends on the ability of the contracting party adequately to judge the probability of an occurrence.
"[A]n expectation is rational if the probability assigned to the predicted event corresponds suitably to the actual likelihood that it will
occur, and if the person making the prediction has good grounds for
assigning the probability he does."130
One commentator has suggested that courts should view party reliance purely along rationality lines. From this standpoint, a court
would treat legal change as any other frustrating market change. Professor Louis Kaplow submits that "[p]erceptive investors will typically
act on probability estimates of possible changes in the legal regime,
just as they will take into account the probabilities of changes in relevant market conditions - such as anticipated future demand, behavior of competitors, weather patterns, and the ultimate feasibility of
untested inventions." 131 Kaplow proposes that, in light of the similarity between market and legal risks, investors should bear the burdens
9f legal transitions in the same way they do the burdens of market
transitions. 132 A private party must absorb whatever losses arise from
a prediction that proves, in retrospect, to be irrational. Kaplow would
therefore do away with transition policies such as the Contract Clause,
129. Stephen R. Munzer, A Theory of Retroactive Legislation, 61 TEXAS L. REV. 425, 429
(1982).
130. Id. at 430. The reader should note that this model does not require absolute certainty in
its prediction. Rather, it demands only that the party have a reasoned basis for her position one which considers the possibility of changes in the environment surrounding the transaction,
including both legal and market transitions. Expectations are neither entirely rational nor en·
tirely irrational. Greater or lesser fluctuation in a state of affairs lends lesser or greater rational·
ity to a contracting party's reliance on the stability of the status quo. A contracting party can
never tell with moral certainty that the law will remain static. See id. at 456-57 (differentiating
between "could not" and "would not" concerning the possibility of government change). If
correctness in prediction were the standard for rationality, however, the occurrence of a legal
change would defeat any expectation that no change would occur. See Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 511, 525 n.38 (1986). The Contract
Clause would then become a dead letter. The question thus becomes what factors a market actor
should consider in deciding whether to rely on a state of affairs, regardless of whether that condi·
tion in fact changes.
131. Kaplow, supra note 130, at 525-26.
132. Id. at 533-36.
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whereby the government must relieve the risks it imposes on private
actors.
Although the heavily regulated industry doctrine does not adopt
Kaplow's suggestion regarding the abolition of transitional relief, it
does assume that parties engage in a modified form of the risk assessment entailed in Kaplow's model. The HRID calculus, however,
hinges on an expectation's legitimacy, not its rationality.
Legitimacy requires that the expectation harmonize with the spirit
of the laws inducing the expectation, and with the "fundamental principles embedded in the legal system itself." 133 By way of illustration,
Munzer provides the example of a market actor who conforms her
actions to the letter of the law, yet knows that her acts run counter to
the goals of the statute on which she relies. 134 A requirement of legitimacy, Munzer reasons, would "permit a frustrating change ... even if
a surprise . . . because of the way the change is connected with the
justificatory structure of the institution." 13 5 Moreover, legitimacy
bears on an expectation's rationality in that it informs the party's ability accurately to predict the future status and treatment of her acts. A
party's estimation of probabilities cannot ignore pertinent facts regarding the purpose of a given statute or the legal system while maintaining a pretension of rationality.
Under the heavily regulated industry doctrine, the reasonableness
of a challenging party's expectation depends less on her judgment as to
133. Munzer, supra note 129, at 432.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 433. The reader might consider the legitimacy requirement in a "curative" legislation context. Professor Hochman delineates two categories of curative statute: (1) "statutes
which ratify prior official conduct"; and (2) statutes "designed retroactively to cure defects in an
administrative system." Hochman, supra note 21, at 704.
After a review of decisions treating statutes of both types favorably, Hochman concludes that
"[i]t is necessary that the legislature should be able to cure inadvertent defects in statutes or their
administration by making what has been aptly called 'small repairs.' " Id. at 705 (footnotes
omitted). More important for present purposes, Hochman observes that "the individual who
claims that a vested right has arisen from the defect is seeking a windfall since, had the legislature's or the administrator's action had the effect it was intended to and could have had, no such
right would have arisen.'' Id.
Munzer's legitimacy requirement and the judicial tolerance of legislative correction are two
sides of the same coin. As an example of a rational but illegitimate expectation, Munzer offers a
scenario in which a man marries less than two years after obtaining a divorce from another
woman. Under the law of his jurisdiction at the time of remarriage, a person cannot marry
within two years after a divorce. Later, this man marries a third woman without first divorcing
the second. In the time between the second and third marriages, however, the legislature repeals
the two-year requirement. The man may now rationally expect that the second marriage is invalid under the law at the time it was entered into, and that he is therefore neither liable for
alimony nor a bigamist. Munzer asserts that because the expectation was not legitimate - that
is, that it was the purpose of the law to validate marriages within two years of divorce, the
expectation is unreasonable. Munzer, supra note 129, at 433.
Curative legislation jurisprudence deals with the same type of scenario Munzer hypothesizes.
The major difference between "legitimacy" and "correction" is in perspective. Whereas
Hochman focuses on the need to allow governments to effect their stated goals, Munzer requires
the actor to account for that need, and thus deprives the actor of reliance on a flawed law.
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the likelihood of legal change in the field than on her acknowledgement of systemic factors, such as the state's interest in the subject matter of the contract. In this regard, the HRID's standard of
reasonableness is a standard of legitimacy. The Court's reasoning in
Exxon and Energy Reserves Group assumes that a market actor's reliance on the state of the law is unreasonable, or, more specifically, illegitimate, because of the nature of heavy regulation. Granted, it is
conceivable that legal change in the heavily regulated field might be
slow or even nonexistent, thus lending rationality to a prediction of
stability. However, the party's expectation is inherently illegitimate,
because one should not expect existing legal rules to be permanent.
Moreover, legitimacy would appear to subsume rationality for
Contract Clause purposes. 136 The heavily regulated industry doctrine
suggests that, when a state manifests its interest in a field through a
scheme of regulation, a market actor should at all times account for
that interest, irrespective of the likelihood of actual legal change.
Legitimacy-focused reasonableness determinations, like the HRID,
permit broad classifications of reasonableness rather than case-by-case
judgments. Courts may carve out areas in which expectations of legal
continuity are inherently illegitimate. For instance, under the HRID,
the Court has held that systemic factors create a lack of stability in
zones of heavy regulation. In light of this uncertainty, the doctrine
holds that anyone conducting business in a heavily regulated field subjects herself to the perils and pitfalls associated with such uncertainty.
136. See. e.g., United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977). The Court in United
States Trust held that a modification of a state's own obligation under a bond issue violated the
Contract Clause. Professor Munzer questions the validity of this holding on the grounds that the
bondholders could not reasonably expect the state not to modify its obligation. Munzer, supra
note 129, at 456-61.
Munzer first argues that the bondholders' reliance was irrational if they believed the covenant
"could not be repealed." Id. at 456-57. "[T]he bondholders •.• should have considered that the
contract clause had been heavily qualified and that for forty years the Supreme Court had struck
down no statute on its sole authority." Id. at 457. The challenging parties thus gave insufficient
weight to the possibility of repeal in their risk assessment.
As to the legitimacy of the bondholders' expectations, Munzer turns to the "fundamental
principles embedded in the legal system" to argue that the expectation was illegitimate. The
concept that a past legislature cannot limit by contract a future legislature's power to act in the
public interest, and the fact that economic legislation is not subject to close scrutiny, both militate against the legitimacy of the parties' reliance. Id. at 457-58.
It would appear that in this respect, Munzer's two requirements overlap. For instance, how
can a party "rationally" expect that a flawed law will not change? Would not the intent of the
law and the legal system's basic principles figure in the ability to predict an event? Further,
Munzer either engages in a little bootstrapping here, or he would have a party include in her
calculus the courts' likely treatment of a challenge, as well as the probability of state action. The
notion that the contracting party in United States Trust should have considered the fact that the
Court over the course of 40 years had rendered the Contract Clause a virtual nullity is profoundly circular. Munzer seems to say that the Contract Clause is dead because the Contract
Clause is dead. If, however, he suggests that individuals consider their chances of vindicating
their rights in court, then market actors would have to account for matters far remote from their
transactions. This would inject another variable into a party's risk calculus - the arbiter as
affecting expectations.
·
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This practice of effecting broadly applicable standards achieves two
significant benefits. First, by avoiding individualized conclusions of
rationality or irrationality, the practice serves judicial economy. Secondly, by explicitly defining zones of uncertainty, courts can provide
market actors with hard and fast rules on which to base their decisions
whether or not to contract.
C. Legislatures and Legislation
Although the HRID presupposes the need to account for subsequent state legislation in an actor's reasonableness calculus, the Court
has not explained why this requirement is important. The Court
merely assumes that the state might decide to change the legal scheme.
This section seeks to define the view of legislatures inherent in the
heavily regulated industry doctrine's assumption that legislative action
is an uncertain variable in a party's risk analysis. The section addresses institutional factors which create instability in the legal backdrop against which contracts are made and explains how these
fundamental principles underlying the legal scheme affect and inform
party reliance. Central to a party's reasonableness calculus is an understanding of discontinuities in legal institutions and the legislative
product. Such an understanding clarifies the factors causing a party's
belief in the stability of the legal scheme ultimately to be unreasonable.
This examination of the factors underlying discontinuities in the
legislative product addresses two aspects of legislatures. Section II.C.l
analyzes how the nature of a fluid lawmaking body - that is, a body
reconstituted at periodic intervals - leads to changes in priorities and
preferences, which in turn create legal discontinuities. Section II.C.2
examines the inherent and reserved powers of state legislatures to
show that their lack of stability ultimately affects a private actor's ability to rely reasonably on an underlying legal framework in entering
into a contract.
1.

Time and Uncertainty

One of the principal factors contributing to changes in legislative
preferences is remoteness in time. This factor is crucial to an understanding of why legal changes arise as well as why the HRID tolerates
such changes. Much as individuals may be poor predictors of their
future preferences, lawmakers are plagued by uncertainty as to what
future conditions will require. In many contexts, legislative and otherwise, an inverse relationship exists between distance in time and the
ability to foresee the wants and needs of one's future self. This phenomenon manifests itself in the tendency to discount future pains and
pleasures, and to accord inordinate weight to present pains and
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pleasures. 137 A juxtaposition of this predisposition in individual and
legislative contexts bears out this assertion. When a party contracts to
perform a service five years hence, that party makes two predictions.
First, she predicts that external conditions - for example, the economy and the environment - will allow performance for which she
will receive fair consideration. Second, she predicts that her preferences will remain substantially the same. 138 For the sake of efficiency, 139 the law assumes that the individual's second prediction is
correct, although this assumption is not necessarily accurate. 140 Except under certain circumstances, 141 the law assumes the first prediction to be accurate.
In the context of a fluid legislature, these assumptions become less
safe. Not only does the lawmaking body face the uncertainty inherent
in making decisions that will not come to fruition until some time in
the future, it also must predict the preferences both of its future self
and of its constituency. A fluid legislature, by definition, will not be
the same body from timeA to timeB, nor will the population the body
represents remain constant from A to B. A lawmaker may be able to
gauge with a high degree of certainty her principals' wishes. However,
when she seeks to speak for a more hypothetical population, that assurance fades. 142 Shifts in the makeup of the constituency, as well as
shifts in its condition, force the legislature to reevaluate its defined
policies and goals. Should the institution fail to engage in such a practice, certain sectors of the population would not enjoy representation
in all matters, nor would they enjoy equal status with those sectors
whose preferences are reflected in a prior legislative pronouncement.143 Therefore, by according full representation through the pro137. This tendency is what is known as a "bias toward the near." See DEREK PARFIT, REA·
159 (1984).
138. See Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763,
780 (1983) (designating the first type of prediction, if erroneous, as giving rise to "disappointment," and the second type as giving rise to "regret").
139. Some scholars have argued that respect for contract does not merely serve efficiency
concerns, but that such a model also acknowledges and protects personal autonomy. See, e.g.,
Stewart E. Sterk, The Continuity of Legislatures: Of Contracts and the Contracts Clause, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 647, 653 (1988).
140. See id. at 657.
141. See, e.g., id. at 655-57 (discussion of bankruptcy, impossibility, and commercial impracticability exceptions to the American rule of respect for contract).
142. Id. at 660 ("[E]specially if one assumes constituents and their representatives to be individualistically oriented, one might expect that a current legislature, representing current individuals, will not adequately account for the interests of future individuals not yet born, not yet of the
age of majority, or not yet citizens of the state.").
143. Further, the failure to reevaluate the preferences of even a static constituency would not
allow for individual discontinuity within that group. To "lock in" the wishes of the population
as of a certain point in time is to deprive that population of the opportunity to avoid Kronman 's
"regret." See supra note 138.
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cess of reevaluation, the lawmaking body adds greatly to the
possibility of inconsistent legislative product.
Legislatures themselves are subject to frequent change. Indeed,
one manifestation of shifts in the constituency and its preferences is
the periodic reconstitution of the legislature. The membership of the
institution might therefore differ greatly from one period to the next.
Prospective decisions of a present legislature involve a prediction of
what its future self as an institution would decide. Because of the differences in content over time, however, the institution cannot be considered continuous with itself in the same way an individual might. 144
A different legislature brings changes in institutional perception not
merely from personal discontinuities among the representatives, but
also from a different membership.
The HRID relies, in part, on the fact of legislative discontinuity.
The doctrine's tolerance of legal change implicitly recognizes that
lawmakers often change their minds in light of new circumstances and
preferences. By removing heavily regulated industries from the Contract Clause's reach, the HRID ensures that no constitutional barrier
prevents legislatures from acting on the basis of such changes. 145
2.

The Powers of the Legislature

In addition to the timing considerations section II.C.1 addresses,
the HRID finds its theoretical bases in the legislature's necessary powers as well as in analogous constitutional doctrine. "Inalienability"
doctrine, a theory developed first in theory and scholarship, 146 then in
the courts, 147 stands for the proposition that a lawmaking body may
not contract away, either explicitly in contract or implicitly by legislative act, a power inherent in that body or granted by the Constitution.
The "inherent" and "reserved" powers of state legislatures, two areas
of inalienability, comprise part of the fundamental principles of the
legal system which bear on an expectation's reasonableness. The
HRID presupposes the existence of these powers in its insistence that
the state be able to reverse itself and to promulgate new policy. The
doctrine thus renders illegitimate any expectation that the state would
not exercise its powers.
Inalienability doctrine helps to explain why we should tolerate discontinuities in the legislative product and why a party must account
144. The fact that a representative may have to campaign for reelection at frequent intervals
skews the legislator's perception. If the lawmaker's individual concern is for reelection, she will
be more likely to seek to satisfy the short-term goals of her constituency and ignore long-term
concerns. The convention of election thus contributes to the representative's, and thereby the
institution's, bias toward the near. See Sterk, supra note 139, at 661.
145. For further discussion of the propriety of allowing a present legislature to define the
interests of and to bind a future legislature, see i'nfra section 11.C.2.a.
146. See infra section 11.C.2.a.
147. See infra section 11.C.2.b.
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for such legal change in its reasonableness calculus. The inherent
powers accrue to the legislature simply by virtue of the legislature's
status as a popularly elected organ. These powers account for many of
the concerns voiced in section II.C.2 by forbidding one legislature
from binding its future self. Similarly, the reserved powers under the
Tenth Amendment permit legislative discontinuities out of concern for
popular sovereignty. 148 Such "essential attribute[s] of sovereignty" 149
allow the state to act in the name of the public good when circumstances so require. To permit a party to deprive the legislature of its
ability to exercise its prerogatives under these powers would thwart
that institution in its efforts to effect important public goals.

a. Inherent powers. The legislature's inherent powers flow directly from the body's discontinuous nature. As Professor Paul Kahn
notes, "[n]ot only do its interests change, as reflected in new majorities
displacing earlier ones, but the constituents themselves change." 150
These changes necessitate a general prerogative "to respond to changing circumstances [and] to reorder priorities in light of these
changes." 151 Inherent powers doctrine derives from a belief in the
need that popular sovereign authority exist always in the present.
"For the Legislator is he, not by whose authority the Lawes were first
made, but by whose authority they now continue to be Lawes." 152
Scholars have therefore been skeptical of a framework of rules binding
the sovereign in perpetuity. "It is thus, in the name of legislative
supremacy, that the English invoke the Blackstonian axiom: 'Acts of
Parliament derogatory from the power of subsequent parliaments bind
not.' "153
The institution's power to abandon, amend, or otherwise modify
existing legal rules reveals itself in the concomitant inability to control
later iterations of the same body. 154 This limit on legislative power
148. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 15, at 405 (describing Tenth Amendment powers
as "the residual prerogatives of sovereignty which the states had not surrendered to the federal
government") (footnote omitted).
149. Paul W. Kahn, Gramm-Rudman and the Capacity of Congress To Control the Future,
13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 185, 221 (1986) (citing United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431
U.S. l, 23 (1977) (stating the rule that prior legislative acts cannot work as a bar to the exercise
of reserved powers)).
150. Kahn, supra note 149, at 199.
151. Id.
152. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 315 (Crawford B. Macpherson ed., Penguin Books
1984) (London 1651).
153. Julian N. Eule, Temporal Limits on the Legislative Mandate: Entrenchment and Retroactivity, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 379, 393 (1987) (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *90).
154. Cf Kahn, supra note 149, at 222-23 & n.135 (citing cases consistent with the "concept
[that] legislative authority •.. is linked essentially to that of popular sovereignty. A legislative
measure that purports to bind future legislatures is, accordingly, an illogical or inappropriate
attempt by the agent of the sovereign to bind the principal.").
The reader might note at this point that it is somewhat perverse that the legislative process

November 1993]

Note -

The Contract Clause

425

appears in "last-in-time" rules of statutory construction: when two
pieces of legislation are in direct conflict, a court will usually apply the
more recent rule, because that rule will be the more accurate statement
of the popular will and current circumstances. I55
Principles of utility and equality also favor the prohibition against
"entrenching," that is, imposing the preferences of the prior legislature
and constituency without the option of modification or repeal. First,
the utilitarian would see that a present legislature has better access to
information available at a lesser cost than does a past legislature. I56 A
prohibition against entrenchment thus allows for policies tailored to
present conditions, and cuts down on factfinding costs for the past
legislature. I57 Further, allowing entrenchment invites tortured interpretations of law and wasted resources in attempts to circumvent the
rule. Iss Entrenchment offends egalitarian concerns because it would
prevent the newer constituency from enjoying equal status with its
predecessors. By placing its interests above those of its successors, the
past legislature deprives a future population of representation, thereby
relegating that population to a lower position in the legal scheme.
Sovereignty would therefore tum upon a rule of "first-in-time."I 59
Ultimately, the notion of inalienability undermines a market actor's ability to rely on a given state of the law. If a party attempts by
assertion of reasonable reliance to maintain the status quo as of the
time of contracting, inalienability doctrine deprives that status quo of
any pretension of permanence. The mandate of the prior legislature
controls only until a later iteration of that body contradicts it. Indeed,
the inevitable concomitant of an entrenchment prohibition is a future
requires such institutional freedom given the basis of the constitutional system. The Framers
created a constitution which was to bind future generations. In doing so, the Constitutional
Convention built in mechanisms which would prevent frequent modification of the document.
Kahn does not find rules defining special amendment or repeal procedures to be problematic
in all circumstances. For instance, Kahn cites the Administrative Procedure Act's express repeal
provision as an example of such a rule. Id. at 201-03 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 559 (1989)). Because
"the APA rule does not purport to regulate the permissible content of legislative actions," Kahn
does not find the provision offensive. Kahn, supra note 149, at 203. It is unclear whether the
same can be said of the Constitution, and, indeed, whether the distinction between first-order
(conduct directed) and second-order (rule directed) rules is valid.
155. See id. at 198 n.50. Alexander Hamilton characterized the concept of "last-in-time" in
statutory interpretation as not merely a rule for the sake of consistency, but a rule of practical
reason. Id. at 199-200 (quoting THE FEDERALisr, supra note 33, No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton),
at 525-26).
156. Cf. JEREMY BENTHAM, HANDBOOK OF PoLmCAL FALLACIES 55 (Harold A. Larrabee
ed., 1952) (originally published as THE BOOK OF FALLACIES: FROM UNFINISHED PAPERS OF
JEREMY BENTHAM, London, John & H.L. Hunt 1824).
157. See Eule, supra note 153, at 387.
158. Id.
159. See Kahn, supra note 149, at 198-99. Further, allowing a legislature to deprive itself of
any of its powers gives rise to questions of self-reference reminiscent of Douglas Hofstadter's
stereo-destroying record. DOUGLAS R. HOFsrADTER, GODEL, EsCHER, BACH: AN ETERNAL
GOLDEN BRAID 75-78 (1979).
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legislature's freedom to repeal. A party's failure to acknowledge this
fact conflicts with the basic rules underlying the legal system and is
therefore illegitimate and undeserving of Contract Clause protection.

b. Reserved powers doctrine. The reserved powers, such as the
eminent domain and police powers, add to the states' ability to promulgate inconsistent legislative product. Apart from the general freedom to revise prior legislative acts, state legislatures may also invoke
the powers reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment when
modifying the existing legal environment. 160 The reserved powers
doctrine not only permits the institution to change its mind in matters
on which it has previously spoken, 161 but also allows intervention into
areas not explicitly covered by current law. Although the powers
under this doctrine are not absolute, private parties enter into transactions subject to the legitimate exercise of the state's powers irrespective
of the government's prior position.162 These powers further limit a
party's ability reasonably to rely on an underlying legal regime.
For example, the eminent domain power vests in the state a permanent power to defeat standing rights in property in order to serve the
public good. In doing so, the power allows the state to claim land
should the state's interests and preferences change with regard to
property rights. Additionally, the power imposes upon private parties
an element of uncertainty militating against an expectation of an absolute property interest. 163 The opinion in West River Bridge Co. v.
Dix, 164 the decision in which the Court upheld a Vermont statute permitting state takings of realty for public purposes, illustrates a judicial
concern that states have the power to resolve problems arising from
imprecise prediction. By the grant of a right in property, the government predicts that such action is in the public interest, or at least not
detrimental to the public good. Should it later be proven otherwise, a
rule forbidding the state from retracting the right granted would deprive a present lawmaking body of a power existing in a prior one, the
power to allow or not allow the property right to vest in a private
actor. By imputing to the private party a recognition of the ability of
the state later to divest the party of a property interest, the Court both
assumes the possibility of legislative discontinuity and removes it from
160. See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
161. As noted in the discussion of reserved powers, supra section I.A, a state may only claim
authority under the police powers when it acts to preserve the public health, safety, or morals.
162. See Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 817-18 (1879) (stating the rule that action or
inaction of prior legislatures does not bind a present legislature in the exercise of its police
powers).
163. See Sterk, supra note 139, at 674-75 (discussing early eminent domain doctrine as a
departure from the Marshall Court's supremacy of contract model).
164. 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507 (1848). For a full discussion of West River Bridge Co., see supra
notes 50-55 and accompanying text.
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the purview of the Contract Clause. 165 Eminent domain thus effectively eliminates a challenging party's expectation of permanence of a
property interest. 166
Another of the reserved powers, the police power, imparts wide
latitude to state legislatures in seeking to serve their citizens' interests.167 As between the prohibition on contractual impairment and the
state's charge to promote the common weal, the courts have long recognized that the former must yield to the latter. 168 That is, public
interests trump private rights. A private party cannot escape the effects of a state's efforts to protect its citizenry under the police power,
even by contracting concerning the subject matter of the new statute.
In Stone v. Mississippi, 169 in which the Court upheld a law invalidating
a lottery charter, the Court adopted the view that a party may not
entrench an alienation of the police power. Despite the consequent
uncertainty imposed on private actors by such a policy, the Stone
Court's endorsement of this type of legislative discontinuity reflects
the same concern for imprecise prediction expressed by the West River
Bridge Co. Court.
The Stone decision, like the opinion in West River Bridge Co., invokes a concept of "implied understanding." 170 Much as existing law
165.
It, then, being clear that the power in question not being within the purview of the restriction imposed by the tenth section of the first article of the Constitution, it remains with the
states to the full extent in which it inheres in every sovereign government.... This is, in
truth, purely a question of power; and, conceding the power to reside in the State government, this concession would seem to close the door upon all further controversy in connection with it.
West River Bridge Co., 47 U.S. (6 How.) at 533.
166. This is not to say, however, that a state may expropriate an individual's property without limitation. The eminent domain power is subject to the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The state must compensate a private party for the property of which it was deprived.
167. See, e.g., Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 480-81 (1905) ("While this power is subject to limitations in certain cases, there is wide discretion on the part of the legislature in determining what is and what is not necessary - a discretion which courts ordinarily will not
interfere with.").
168. See, e.g., 199 U.S. at 480 ("This power, which in its various ramifications is known as
the police power, is an exercise of the sovereign right of the Government to protect the lives,
health, morals, comfort and general welfare of the people, and is paramount to any rights under
contracts between individuals.").
169. 101 U.S. 814 (1879). For a full discussion of Stone, see supra notes 56-64 and accompanying text.
170. In light of the ever-present police power, "[a]ny one ... who accepts a lottery charter
does so with the implied understanding that the people, in their sovereign capacity, and through
their properly constituted agencies, may resume it at any time when the public good shall require, whether it be paid for or not." 101 U.S. at 821; cf. West River Bridge Co., 47 U.S. at 53233 (discussing the inherent power of the state to divest a party of her real property).
Chief Justice Waite reconciled this portion of the holding with Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819), by adverting to the part of that opinion stating
"that the framers of the Constitution did not intend to restrain States in the regulation of their
civil institutions, adopted for internal government, and that the instrument they have given us is
not to be so construed." Stone, 101 U.S. at 820 (citing Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at
629). Because depriving the state of Mississippi of its police power would function as such a
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is incorporated into every contract, 171 the Court read the police powers into those same contracts. In this way, both legal rules and "metarules," like the police power and inalienability doctrine, become constructive terms of every contractual agreement. These metarules substantially limit a private party's ability legitimately to assert unfair
surprise when the state acts under such rules.
The heavily regulated industry doctrine reflects reserved power
and inalienability concerns in its view of the legislature's necessary
powers. As to reserved powers doctrine, the heavily regulated industry doctrine adopts substantially the same methodology the Stone and
West River Bridge Co. Courts employed. Apart from its similarity to
the implied term logic in the reserved powers cases, the heavily regulated industry doctrine provides for the same policy concerns involved
in the earlier cases. The doctrine carves out areas in which the state
has particularly strong interests, then gives the legislature free rein in
those fields. The doctrine also draws upon inherent powers doctrine in
that the HRID seeks to prevent entrenchment of prior legislative
wishes due to party reliance. Under the doctrine, the Court considers
the most recent statement of the legislative will to be effective, regardless of the government's prior position. Thus, individuals cannot reasonably expect immunity from legislative changes.

III.

GOVERNMENTAL FIELD OCCUPATION

In light of the issues discussed in Part II, this Part suggests an
approach to Contract Clause problems that accounts both for the reasonableness of party reliance and for the uncertainty inherent in any
particular contractual context. This Note proposes that the reliance
logic implicit in the heavily regulated industry doctrine applies beyond
scenarios in which there is pervasive and historical state regulation.
While the state creates uncertainty through heavy regulation, it also
creates uncertainty by its need to exercise its substantive prerogatives
such as the police power and eminent domain. The certainty with
which a party contracts turns upon the legislature's interest in the subject matter of the contract. This Note terms the presence of such interests field occupation.
Under the field occupation model, a court will determine the presence of any unfair surprise solely by classifying a contract according to
the nature and extent of state action in the field implicated by the contract, existing as of the time of contracting. In this respect, field occurestraint, Waite asserted that the act at issue would fall within the exception to the Dartmautlz
College rule.
171. This is not to say that a private party may claim existing law as a contractual term for
the purposes of reliance. Rather, legal rules are only implied terms for the purposes of making
the contract something more than an unenforceable promise. To hold to a more expansive view
of incorporation would impermissibly "limit the ability of state legislatures to amend their regu·
latory legislation." General Motors Co. v. Romein, 112 S. Ct. 1105, 1111 (1992).
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pation analysis is a test of legitimacy of the sort discussed in section
H.B. A court will not look to each specific circumstance to determine
an expectation's rationality. Rather, field occupation defines broad
classes of legal instability in which an expectation of continuity will be
illegitimate, or unreasonable. The model thus limits a court's analysis
to finding whether a contract falls within an occupied area. The
party's reliance will not be reasonable if the state has created sufficient
uncertainty through the lawmaking process or even if such state action
is likely to occur in the future. If a contract falls within such an area
of uncertainty, no Contract Clause violation exists.
Field occupation analysis both accounts for the state's need to act
in the public interest, and provides a constant standard against which
parties might judge the reasonableness of their reliance. In addition,
the field occupation model casts off the balancing method the Court
currently uses. Regardless of the substantiality of the contractual impairment or the relative strengths of the public and private interests
implicated, this test contemplates what a private party should expect
in the way of government action.
Field occupation appears in three forms: "heavy regulation," "reserved powers" occupation, and "public purpose" occupation. Each
of these three classifications of state action occupies a field in a different manner yet, in all three, a private party's expectations of stability
are inherently unreasonable. Sections III.A, IIl.B, and III.C discuss
these forms of field occupation respectively. Each section describes
the different methods of occupation and the effects on party expectations. Because this Note has already discussed heavy regulation and
reserved powers at length, this Part analyzes them only briefly. Public
purpose occupation receives fuller treatment. Section III.C explains
that when, at the time of contracting, a transaction is imbued with a
public nature or impacts on the public interest in a way which might
give rise to state action, the market actor should foresee the
probability of such action and the consequent possibility of contractual impairment. Even absent prior government action, sufficient uncertainty exists under these circumstances to trump a reliance claim.
Section III.C also suggests certain factors bearing the earmarks of
public purpose field occupation that a court should consider in its determination. Section III.D argues that the field occupation model provides several advantages over the Court's post-1934 approach. These
advantages include consistency with the clause's original purpose,
clearer standards for private conduct, and incentives for greater discipline in legislative decisionmaking.
A. Heavy Regulation

The scenario that most visibly manifests the uncertainty or reasonableness thesis is the heavily regulated industry. In a context of heavy
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regulation, the state "occupies" not only those matters within a field it
specifically regulates, but all aspects of the field. 172 The state thus defines the area as one in which it has a particular interest. Under the
field occupation model, contracting parties constructively acknowledge this prominent element of public control, as well as the uncertainty it entails. 173 By placing the onus of accounting for legal change
on the market actor, the field occupation model removes heavy regulation from the purview of the Contract Clause. Thus, in the heavily
regulated industry, the private actor suffers no unfair surprise by the
introduction of "subsequent amendments to achieve the legislative
end."174
172. See supra section II.A.
173. See supra section II.A.
174. Federal Housing Admin. v. Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84, 91 (1958). The reader should
note at this point that government contracts present an anomaly for the field occupation model.
Under the model's reasoning, a government contract would fall somewhere in the range of a
heavily regulated industry because the state speaks directly to subject matter of the contract.
However, there are qualitative differences between regulation and contract which render the
heavily regulated industry model inapplicable to a government contract scenario. In a regulation
context, the state seeks to exercise its authority as an institution, thereby giving rise to "obliga·
tion." In a contractual context, however, the state operates as any other private actor might
operate.
The truth is, States and cities, when they borrow money and contract to repay it with interest, are not acting as sovereignties. They come down to the level of ordinary individuals.••.
A promise to pay, with a reserved right to deny or change the effect of the promise, is an
absurdity.
Murray v. City of Charleston, 96 U.S. 432, 445 (1877).
Although government contract contexts are qualitatively different from the others listed, one
could argue that the field occupation model applies to government contracts. The state does not
occupy a field by contracting in that industry. Rather, the state implicitly asserts that it does not
seek to act in that area as an authority, but instead as a market actor. By surrendering its
position of authority, the state affirmatively de-occupies, or vacates the field for the purposes of
that transaction. The state thus contracts with an eye toward inducing reliance, giving rise to
reasonable expectations.
Although this inducement will not ab initio render a subsequent repeal invalid, City of El
Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497 (1965) (holding statute modifying state's obligation only by limit·
ing defaulting purchasers' ability to reclaim property does not violate Contract Clause); Faitoute
Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502 (1942) (holding statute modifying state's
own municipal bond obligation valid under the Blaisdell test), it will deprive the legislature of
any claim that it sought to exercise dominion over an industry by the prior legislative action. An
assertion of control of an area must arise from a condition or act outside of the contract. The
courts have therefore treated parties differently based on the persona the state adopts in its action. Cf. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 15, at 406-07. Courts will accord regulation prefer·
ential treatment under the general rule, while scrutinizing modification of government contracts
for validity on an act-by-act basis.
By way of illustration, the reader might contrast United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431
U.S. 1 (1977), with the heavily regulated industry cases. In United States Trust, the Court's
analysis focused on the notion that "a State is not completely free to consider impairing the
obligations of its own contracts on a par with other policy alternatives. Similarly, a State is not
free to impose a drastic impairment when an evident and more moderate course would serve its
purposes equally well." 431 U.S. at 30-31. The circumstances surrounding the repeal did not
justify the repeal in terms of either reasonableness or necessity. The Court thus invalidated the
contractual impairment. The Court, in finding that the legislation violated the Contract Clause,
emphasized the fact that the state sought to modify its own contractual obligations. 431 U.S. at
23. Unlike other instances in which a state exercises its reserved powers to impose retroactive
effects on market actors, a state's efforts to modify its own financial obligations does not deserve
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Heavy regulation also presents the easiest case for the field occupation model. Here, the state's method of occupation is both active and
apparent; an extensive scheme of regulation is in place and enforced.
Parties are constructively aware of the state's interest in the field by
virtue of their submission to these laws. While questions may arise
concerning the breadth of the heavy regulation, a Contract Clause
challenge will fail once a court finds that the private party has contracted in a heavily regulated industry.
An examination of Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power &
Light Co.1 75 from a field occupation standpoint illustrates how the
model would treat HRID scenarios. In Energy Reserves Group, the
Court upheld a Kansas statute regulating natural gas prices. 176 As the
Court noted in its opinion, natural gas producers had long been subject to "extensive and intrusive" state regulation. 177 For field occupation purposes, this fact alone would have removed the Kansas natural
gas industry from the Contract Clause's zone of protection. The comprehensive nature of the legal scheme rendered unreasonable any expectation of legal consistency. In this respect, the model's treatment
of Energy Reserves Group differs from the Court's. Although the
Court considered such balancing factors as the extent of contractual
impairment, the existence of a legitimizing public purpose, and the
reasonableness of the impairment, 178 field occupation looks only to the
presence of thorough state action to deny relief under the Contract
Clause.
B. Reserved Powers

The field occupation model also requires a market actor to recognize and account for the uncertainty created by the police and eminent
domain powers. In this regard, the model relies on much the same
logic as the implied term doctrine embodied in Stone v. Mississippi 179
and West River Bridge Co. v. Dix. 180 The reader will recall that, in
both these decisions, the Court read into all contracts a term that the
state could at any time impair the contract in the exercise of the state's
the degree of deference usually accorded such exercises. The Court therefore looked closely at
the reasonableness and necessity of the repudiation of the state's obligation. 431 U.S. at 29-32
("[A] State cannot refuse to meet its legitimate financial obligations simply because it would
prefer to spend the money to promote the public good rather than the private welfare of its
creditors.").
Thus, in spite of the apparent ill fit of government contracts to the field occupation model, the
area of government contracts in fact presents merely a special category for the model.
175. 459 U.S. 400 (1983).
176. 459 U.S. at 413-16. For a full discussion of Energy Reserves Group, see supra notes 11922 and accompanying text.
177. 459 U.S. at 414 & n.18.
178. 459 U.S. at 411-13.
179. 101 U.S. 814, 821 (1879).
180. 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507, 532 (1848).
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reserved powers. 181 Regardless of a legislature's prior acts or prior
failure to act, because the state holds inalienable power over matters of
police and property, the state at all times occupies these fields. Even if
the state should attempt explicitly to abandon one of these powers, a
resumption of that power is wholly within the state's right. 182 All contracts are subject to this continuing occupation. Thus, the field occupation model invalidates a party's claim of unfair surprise should the
exercise of a reserved power contravene an obligation in the party's
contract.
As with heavy regulation, a court can easily determine the constitutionality of a reserved powers statute under the field occupation
model. Although the reserved powers' manner of occupation is not
necessarily active, the occupation is apparent. The powers of police
and eminent domain are explicit and ever present. Unlike heavy regulation, a private party does not acknowledge the reserved powers by
conducting business in a regulated area. Rather, through their status
as citizens in the constitutional scheme, market actors submit to the
states' Tenth Amendment powers.
If a court finds a contract to fall within a state's reserved powers,
field occupation defines the contracting party's expectation of stability
to be unreasonable and therefore unprotected. For instance, in Stone
v. Mississippi, 183 the Court addressed a challenge to a statute revoking
a lottery charter. Under the field occupation model, the Court would
have determined whether lotteries were among those areas properly
regulated under the police power. Upon finding that lotteries affect
the health, safety, or morals of the populace, the Court would have
upheld the legislation, because an expectation that the state could not
exercise its police power is illegitimate and therefore unreasonable.
Given the similarities between field occupation and implied term
methodology, it is not surprising that this process is largely the same
as that which the Court followed in Stone.
C. Public Purpose Occupation
Public purpose occupation is the third category of field occupation.
Here, no prior state action or inalienable power supports a current
exercise of state power. Nonetheless, an expectation that the legislature will not act still would be unreasonable under "public purpose
occupation" if the court finds that the contract implicates important
public concerns. The discussion below sets out some of the considerations that would permit such a finding.
As Blaisdell 184 and its progeny demonstrate, a greater possibility
181.
182.
183.
184.

See supra section I.A.
See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
101 U.S. 814 (1879).
290 U.S. 398 (1934) (discussed supra in notes 65-74 and accompanying text).
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of unfair surprise exists when the state seeks to legislate in an area it
has not traditionally controlled than in an area in which the state has
previously declared its interest. 185 These decisions, however, recognize that states need to provide for the common weal in matters besides health, safety, or morals. 186 A state will have important interests
in protecting itself and its citizenry in areas including, inter alia, employment relations, 187 environmental issues, 188 and economic hardship.189 In this context the Court faces the need to allow the states "to
protect their fundamental interests."19o
While a legislature's efforts to "[e]nter[] a field it ha[s] never before
sought to regulate" 191 increase the likelihood of unfairness, this fact
alone should not end the analysis. 192 The legislature still suffers from
a "bias toward the near" 193 and all the frailties entailed in prospective
decisionmaking. 194 An absolute bar against retroactive lawmaking beyond reserved powers and heavy regulation would ignore this phenomenon and ultimately deprive the state of an important, perhaps
necessary, power.
To avoid such a result, the Court has opted to engage in an ad hoc
185. See, e.g., Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 245-47 (1978) (discussing the absence of state regulation in the area as giving rise to unfair surprise).
186. See supra section I.B.
187. See General Motors Corp. v. Romein, 112 S. Ct. 1105 (1992).
188. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
189. See Home Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
190. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 443-44.
191. Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 249 (1978).
192. It may strike the reader as perverse that when a prior legislature has not passed legislation in a field that it binds its successors, while prior enactments free a successor legislature to
act. See Eule, supra note 153, at 452-53 (contrasting Allied Steel and Vebc).
Professor Eule refers to these unregulated fields as "vacant lots." One problem Eule finds
regarding vacant lots is whether they are left vacant by "design or by inattention." Id. at 453.
"The task, therefore, is one of giving content to legislative silence. Should a history of legislative
inactivity be construed to signal approval of the status quo or treated as devoid of meaning?
Imparting content to the failure to speak is surely among the most futile of endeavors." Id.
(footnote omitted).
Let us assume, however, that, prior to the enactment of the statute in Allied Steel, in which
the Court struck down a Minnesota law modifying existing pension agreements, all employers
similar to Allied had pension plans roughly along the lines mandated by the statute. At that
time, then, the industry norm is the same as that dictated by the new law. In this context, how
could Allied assert that legislative silence endorsed its extant plan? The maintenance of the
status quo rationale would not help here.
Let us further assume that, without directly dictating conduct, the state provided incentives
to employers to adopt plans similar to those later mandated. There is regulatory silence on the
matter, but the state has a clearly enunciated policy preference. The only basis for reliance a
market actor might have in this context is the expectation that compliance with the policy would
remain voluntary. It is unclear whether the Court would have found reasonable reliance in Allied Steel given these hypothetical facts. However, the element of uncertainty introduced by the
government action makes such a finding much more strained than it would be in the absence of
that action.
193. See PARFIT, supra note 137, at 159.
194. See supra section 11.C.1.
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balancing of public and private interests. The factors enumerated in
Energy Reserves Group permit a state to serve its legitimate ends when
the contractual impairment is insubstantial, when the law serves a significant public purpose, and when the means are narrowly tailored to
the ends. 195 These factors, however, contemplate issues beyond those
for which a party might provide in a risk calculus, and thereby disregard the Contract Clause's purpose of protecting reasonable
expectations. 196
The question then becomes how to provide for public initiatives
while maintaining consistency with the clause's focus on expectations.
In order to account adequately for the state's need to effect important
public policies, the Court should force the private actor to consider the
societal effects of the transactions into which it enters. Such a practice
will inform the party's prediction of potential future government
action.
The relevant concern for the field occupation model is the "public
purpose" element. The model's view of reliance would require a court
to consider the potential public effects of a private party's business
when that business or class of business affects or might foreseeably
affect the broader public interest at the time of contracting. Although
any transaction will entail some externalities, field occupation looks
only to those enterprises that affect broad classes of state interests.
For instance, if a private party conducts business in a field that affects
great numbers of people or substantially affects a somewhat lesser
number, that party should reasonably predict that the legislature
might likely regulate the field at some point. Further, the model encourages the market actor to look beyond her own operations to the
industry as a whole. A practice of a single market actor might not
significantly affect broad sectors, but that practice applied on an industry-wide basis might do so. The larger the segment of the population
the actor affects by her practices, products, or employment, the greater
the likelihood that the state will have an interest in regulating that
actor. By recognizing the public nature of a market actor's transactions, this portion of the field occupation model carves out an area in
whichforeseeable, potential state action destroys the reasonableness of
an expectation of legal stability.
Public purpose occupation provides the most difficult context for
the field occupation model. In contrast to both heavy regulation and
reserved powers occupation, this category's manner of occupation is
both inactive and latent. There is no prior legislative activity in the
195. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
196. For instance, an examination of whether a statute substantially impairs a market actor's
contract ignores the issue whether that impairment might reasonably have been expected.
Rather, this element of the Court's test would legitimize a state act on the basis of increments of
effect.
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area, and no broad legal rule or convention exists to notify a party of a
state interest. Therefore, a court's determination of public purpose occupation will entail line drawing on a case-by-case basis more frequently than will the other two forms of occupation. Once a court
finds a field occupied, however, the court will treat the contract the
same way it would a heavy regulation or reserved powers contract.
Under the model, the contract will not receive Contract Clause
protection.
Given the considerations listed above, the Court may have wrongly
decided Allied Structural Steel v. Spannaus, where it struck down a
Minnesota pension law that impaired prior pension agreements. 197
Although no prior state regulation governed the pension plans at issue
in Allied Steel, various factors may have suggested that Allied had
reason to expect regulation. For instance, if operations involving one
hundred or more employees employed the majority of the citizens of
Minnesota, the public nature of the employment relations would give
rise to a corresponding legislative interest. Further, if the industry
practice in pension plans did not serve the needs of employees as well
as the Allied plan did, Allied should have recognized this fact. Allied
should then have incorporated into its risk calculus the possibility that
the public effects of the industry practice would instigate regulation.
Finally, because employee-protection regulation was pervasive, Allied
might reasonably have expected that pension plans specifically would
become a subject of such regulation.19s Although the presence of a
single one of these factors might or might not have given rise to a field
occupation in Allied Steel, an examination of the totality of the circumstances surrounding Allied's contract demonstrates that Allied's
expectations were perhaps unreasonable.
This approach to "vacant lot" scenarios permits the state to exercise its powers retroactively in fields not previously designated as occupied, but only when that exercise serves a sufficiently public purpose.
Further, it does so in a manner geared toward the Contract Clause's
original purpose of protecting reasonable expectations. The model
creates a central focus for Contract Clause jurisprudence, thereby doing away with the current piecemeal standard in favor of a more holistic approach.

D. Field Occupation versus Balancing
The field occupation model provides several benefits over a balancing standard. First, by focusing 9n reliance, field occupation maintains a methodological continuity with the pre-Blaisdell decisions.
197. For a full discussion of Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978), see

supra notes 88-95 and accompanying text.
198. See Allied Steel, 438 U.S. at 261 n.8 (Brennan, J. dissenting) (indicating the pervasiveness of employee-protection regulation).
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Indeed, field occupation functions as a natural extension of the reserved powers decisions in the mid- to late-nineteenth century. The
model's adoption of essentially an implied term rationale flows from
Stone and West River Bridge Co. in a manner that achieves Blaisdell's
goal of permitting a broader range of state action, but without the
"modern" methodology.
Further, the field occupation model imposes on both individuals
and legislatures a measure of rigor the balancing standard fails to provide. In order to state a Contract Clause claim under the model, market actors must ensure before entering a transaction that they have
considered all relevant factors. Not only must they contemplate prior
government action, they must also account for potential public effects
of their enterprises. Legislatures, without the ever-present possibility
of winning in a court's balancing of interests, will have an incentive to
exercise greater care in drafting statutes to avoid defeating reasonable
expectations. Although states still enjoy broad latitude under the field
occupation model, legislatures, if their regulations impair contracts,
must ensure that their product addresses matters of public import, and
even then, matters which a market actor should have expected upon
entering into a transaction to be public in nature.
Finally, field occupation provides broad and clear standards on
which an actor might base her risk calculus. In spite of its tolerance of
uncertainty, the model injects greater certainty into the judiciary's
treatment of Contract Clause challenges than does the current balancing test. The model limits the judicial discretion entailed in the postBlaisdell Contract Clause jurisprudence, in which the clause's applicability depends largely on who conducts the balancing. Although some
discretion remains in a court's definition of public purpose occupation,
the field occupation model provides a measure of predictability and
consistency absent from recent decisions.
CONCLUSION

With its adoption of a balancing test to address Contract Clause
problems, the Supreme Court has diverged from the clause's purpose
of protecting expectations. This departure from the Court's early reliance-based approach has deprived the clause of the clarity and certainty it once possessed.
One element of the Court's current test, however, represents a return to an emphasis on reasonable expectations. The heavily regulated
industry doctrine reasons that a private actor who conducts business
in an area subject to a pervasive legal scheme cannot expect to avoid
the effects of a change in that scheme. The doctrine rests on the notion that in order for a reliance claim to receive Contract Clause protection, that reliance must at least be "reasonable." Further, the
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doctrine finds its roots in the fluid nature of a popular sovereign, as
well as in the legislature's inalienable powers.
Using the heavily regulated industry doctrine as a springboard, the
above analysis demonstrates the Supreme Court should predicate its
treatment of all Contract Clause challenges on whether the state has
asserted or was likely to assert control over a field. This control may
manifest itself in three ways, ranging from "heavy regulation,"
whereby the state governs substantially all aspects of a field, to "reserved powers," when the Constitution grants to the state power over
a field, to "public purpose" occupation, under which the state has an
interest in a field and therefore might foreseeably regulate a matter.
Although the Court has never based a decision entirely on this aspect
of a legislative act, the opinions are generally consistent with the perspective taken in the field occupation model, if only because the Court
has never invalidated a statute aimed at a heavily regulated industry.
In determining the legitimacy of a party's assertion of unfair surprise, the model suggests that the Court should require that party,
when engaging in her risk calculus, to look beyond the isolated transaction to the possibility of governmental action. A requirement of adequate, though not necessarily accurate, prediction accords with the
Contract Clause's original purpose of protecting reasonable expectations, while permitting the state to legislate in areas it deems necessary
to serve the public good.
The field occupation model provides a coherent basis for the
Court's determination of reasonableness in light of its dual goals. By
delineating zones of uncertainty, the model simplifies the Contract
Clause test to the issue of reliance. Further, by recognizing the various factors a party should consider in its risk calculus, it puts market
actors on notice as to the possibility of legislative interference with
their contracts when the public character of those contracts is sufficiently great.

